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,
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

-------------------------------------------------------------INTERNATIONAL HARVESTER CREDIT
CORPORATION,

)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,

)

vs.

Case No. 16205

)

PIONEER TRACTOR & IMPLEMENT
INC. , WAYNE A. SCHOENFELD '
and DORA C. SCHOENFELD,

)
)

Defendants-A?pellants.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff sued the defendants upon wholesale notes and
an open account assigned to plaintiff by International
Harvester Company.

Defendants denied any balance due alleging

various defenses and joined International Harvester Company
upon a third party complaint.

Defendants appeal from an adverse

judgment.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The trial Court denied defendant's request for a jury
trial, allowed in the record various matters of evidence to which
objection was made by counsel, and from said evidence made adverse
findings of fact, conclusions of law and a judgment adverse to
defendants.

A motion to amend the findings, conclusions of law and

judgment or in the alternative, for a new trial was denied.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants seek reduction of the judgment of those
items not proved in accordance with the rules of evidence and
the law applicable to the facts of this case, or in the alternative, for a new trial on all issues with a jury.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff commenced this action upon a complaint
alleging that the plaintiff financed the purchase of parts and
equipment upon open account and wholesale notes by the defendant
Pioneer Tractor, alleging that credit was given for equipment
returned, and that after applying all proper offsets, leaving a
balance due of $27,012.43.

Exhibit "B" which was alleged to be

an itemization of said balance was merely an invoice from
International Harvester Company upon which is handwritten the
figures of:
"$ 21,962.64 Balance account
1,006.86 Jones interest charged back
4,311.81 Balance notes

$ 27,281.31 Total due
268.88 Less interest back
$ 27,012.43" (R. 155)

Thereafter the defendants filed an ans,-.~er, and requestec
that the plaintiff produce all documents, letters, memoranda,
notices of sale or any other writings of any nature whatsoever,
which plaintiff has in its possession which arose out of the
transaction sued upon herein. (R. 131).
-2Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Exhibit "C" also attached to the complaint (1.. lS9)
purports to be a demand upon the account made demand for
"$22,700.62 charged on account" together with the alleged
balance on notes.
An amended complaint was thereafter filed wherein

the plaintiff alleged in addition to the allegations of the
original complaint "prior to the commencement of this action,
International Harvester Company sold, transferred and assigned
to the plaintiff, all of its right, title and interest in end to
the notes and the account sued upon." (R. 128).

An answer was

filed which raised the defense that the complaint failed to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, admitted that
the alleged documents were attached to the original complaint,
denied that either the plaintiff or International Harvester
Company held the notes sued upon, denied any balance due, raised
the affirmative defense of unconscionability, unenforceable
penalties, lack of notice of sale to establish deficiencies, improper charees, and further, alleged the actual sale of secured
property by plaintiff for sums in excess of the amounts credited
to defendants. (R. 120).
A third party complaint was filed against International
Harvester based upon the failure of International Harvester to
advise the defendants that International Harvester Credit Corp.
would not include in its floor plan financing the cost of freight
along with the invoice price upon new machines.

That thereafter,

the plaintiff refused to finance the cost of frei?,ht on said machines and committed other wrongful acts which caused the financial
collapse of Pioneer Tractor (R. 121-122), and further that certain
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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WTDD&ful

acts on behalf of the plaintiff caused termination of

the dealership agreement. (R. 122).
On April 14, 1978, the defendants herein tendered
payment to the plaintiff of $6,000.00 plus the sum of approximately $5,000.00 in a credit reserve account held by plaintiff.

(R. 118).
At a pre-trial held April 21, 1978, the plaintiff
claimed a balance due of $27,012.43.

(R. 108).

On May 24,1978,

a request for jury trial was filed by the defendants and the jury .
fee tendered.

(R. 106).

A motion to strike the jury request was

made by the plaintiff primarily on the grotmd that the action was
based upon foreclosure.

(R. 94-98).

This motion was granted. (R.61

At the trial the plaintiff, rather than relying upon the
exhibits alleged in the amended complaint and attached to the
original complaint relied upon Exhibit "1", a dealer sales and
service agreement between the defendant Pioneer and International
Harvester Company which has an addendum stapled to the back cover
and Exhibit "2" which purports to be an agreement between Pioneer
and the plaintiff dated February 10, 1976 which has several exhibi:
attached thereto.
Exhibit "1" is a sales and service agreement between
International Harvester Company and Pioneer, and at oage 7 first
paragraph,

covers sales on credit, and in dealing with interest,

the contract provides:
"Such notes or contracts shall mature according
to the terms in effect at the time of delivery and
draw interest at the rate established by the Companv
and specified therein."
(emphasis added)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
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Stapled to Exhibit "1" is a puroorted scheclule of
Disco\mts and terms.

This schedule is not contained 1n tbe

be.a,

of the agreement which makes up Exhibit "1", which was e1pe4 by
Wayne Schoenfeld as president of Pioneer, but is stapled to the
back cover.

It is apparent from the staple holes in the reet of

Exhibit "1" and the lack of staple holes in the schedule, that
the schedule, at one time or another, was not attached to EKbibit
"1", because there is a set of staple holes which go thr01Jih f1'011l
cover to cover of the original exhibit, but these holes do not so
through the schedule.

The schedule, on the 4th page thereof pro-

vides as follows:
"Interest on floor plan obligations will be
assessed monthly. Before and after maturity rates
for the ensuing month will be determined in relation
to the "prime rate" in effect at four of seven specified
New York City banks on the third Monday of the current
month." (emphasis added)
Certain minimum and maximum rates are purportedly set by this
oaragraph.
Based upon Exhibit "1" and "2", Del Homestead, a witness
for the plaintiff, testified over objections of plaintiff as to no
foundation at pages 216 and 217 that interest upon the total claim
was based upon the prime rate and was the sum of $5,291.09.

The

writer, searched Exhibit "1" and "2" for a provision as to interest
upon the open account, an alleged balance of over $21,000.00 and
to this writer's knowledge, neither of these documents provided for
any rate of interest for charges upon the open account.
Further, at page 213, lines 20-30, R. 214, L. 1-26, Mr.
Homestead was asked what the balance was upon the open account and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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objections made by defense counsel upon the basis of hearsay,
not best evidence and no foundation were overruled and the witness:
testified at L. 1, page 214 that the balance was $21,694.26.

The

witness then conceded that $1,914.07 of this amount was in error

(R. 10, L. 8-12, R. 218) thus leaving a balance of $19,780.19.
(R. 218, L. 12-14).

These figures were all used by the Court in

arriving at the balance owed in the findings of fact and conclusions of law and judgment.
During the time that these amounts were billed to Pionee:
the defendant, Wayne Schoenfeld disputed various charges made by
International Harvester Company on the account.
R. 220, L. 1-27, R. 383, L. 25-30).

(R.

219, L. 18-30,

International Harvester often

sent goods not ordered or sent more goods than were ordered.
(R. 303-307, R. 386 L. 5-16, R.

383-386 L. 25-30, R. 408 L. 10-U

R. 401 L. 19-30 ,R. 402 L. 1-30, R. 403 L. 1-23, R. 386 L. 5-16).

The charges upon the account were not typical open
account charges.

(Court's own Memorandum Decision, R. 27 & 28).

Exhibit "2" was described by Mr. Homestead as being a
document that sets up the financing arrangements between plainti::
and Pioneer for retail financing
(R.

178).

of agricultural equipment.

The dealer's reserve account, was described by this

witness as protecting the dealer from astronomical losses. (R.l8;
The reserve account for retail contracts on new and used equipme:
is described in paragraph 8 of Exhibit "E" attached to Exhibit":
and included therein is a clause which provides that such deale:
reserve account shall be debited with "all losses" paragraph

-6Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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g,,

of Exhibit "E" attached to Exhibit "2", and that after the
reserve account has reached $1,000.00, that losses charged to the
Dealer's Reserve Account shall not exceed the credit balance in
said account existing at the time of the loss.
It was undisputed that as of December 31, 1976, the
Dealer's Reserve Account of Pioneer had a $5,000.00 balance.
(R. 511 and Exhibit "12").
Plaintiff's witness Del Homestead was allowed by the
Court to testify orally over objection of defense counsel as to
the following losses resulting from retail contracts, which were
charged not to the reserve account but the dealer's open account,
which charges were included in the balance upon the open account.
a.

On a retail installment contract with Myron

Jones, a charge of $2,500.00 was made to Pioneers open account
reversing an alleged credit of $2,500.00 upon the account and
then a charge of $1,006.86 was also charges as interest upon the
retail contract which was not in evidence. (R. 188-190).
b.

On a retail contract with Duane Taylor, an

alleged dispute by the customer that the finance charge and payments were higher than he the customer had agreed resulted in a
charge of $2,832.46 (R. 191-194), objection was made on the basis
of hearsay as to the contentions of the retail customer Jones.
(R. 191-193).
c.

On a retail contract with William Branch, the

customer allegedly withheld $1,278.35 for an alleged mechanical
problem with a used tractor.
·o~as

No contract was in evidence, nor

·
anv testlrnonv
ot h er th an hearsay evl"dence to prove any defect

or the
withholding of funds. (R. 194-196).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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d.

In the matter of a retail contract of Garth

Sweeten, the Court allowed testimony of Mr. Homestead as to the
fact that a hitch on a drill was ordered, but was not furnished
and without the production of any written contract or without
testifying as to whether or not the witness had personal knowledge of this shortage (R. 196-197), Mr. Don Sterrett, sales
manager of Pioneer testified that the drills in question were
ordered from International Harvester Company with a hitch, but
when the drills arrived, the hitch was not included.
open acco\.mt was charged with $599.03.
e.

Pioneer's

(R. 343-344).

In the matter of Sam Kogianes, evidence of

out of Court statements were allowed in to prove that despite
a written agreement to the contrary, the customer contended
that he was entitled to a different attachment on a combine.
(R. 197-200).

While the witness contended that Schoenfeld agreed

to it, Schoenfeld testified that he only agreed to obtain a diff·
erent attachment after Homestead threatened to "unwind three

(3)

contracts" which Kogianes had made, which would have resulted in
a loss to the dealership of $5,000.00 in lost profit. (R. Sll-511
The defendant Pioneer, on the other hand itemized their
contentions of the erroneous charges upon the account item by
item in Exhibit "12", which was prepared by Hr. Schoenfeld from
statements of plaintiff received by Pioneer. (R. 158).

Included

in this list were the charges from a to c above on retail contrac
and the $1,914.07 which plaintiff conceded prior to trial.

This

list was made available to Mr. Homestead and discussed in a me"
in September of 1977 between Homestead, Critchfield and Schoenfe
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
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Also included in Exhibit "12" is a purported charge of
"$10,304.30 in freight which was paid to IH (J:ntemati.onal Harvester
Company) and not refunded in full by 3% deduction claimed by IH."
It was the contention of defendants at trial that there was no
foundation for such a charge to the open account, that the invoices to support such a charge had never been produced for exam(R. 281-282)
ination or in Court/and that such a charge bore no reasonable
relationship to the expense of International Harvester Company.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING
EVIDENCE THAT THE DEFENDANTS OWED
THE PLAINTIFF THE SUM OF $19,780.19
Plaintiff's witness, Homestead testified over the objections of the defendants upon the grounds of hearsay, no foundation and best evidence, that the books and records of the
plaintiff showed that defendants owed to

plain~iff

the sum of

$1,006.86 for interest charged upon the Myron Jones retail contract
and $21,694.26 which was the balance upon an open account. (R. 211213).

Then Mr. Homestead conceded that $1,914.07 of these charges

were in error. (R.218).

The balance arrived at by these figures

was the precise figure used in the findings of fact, and judgment
entered herein.
The witness then proceeded to enumerate over the objection
of defense counsel, certain charges which had been made to the
Pioneer account based upon the alleged failure of customers to pay
certain retail contracts.

~either

the contracts or the records

showing oayment or non-payment of these contracts were offered or
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology-9Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

admitted as evidence.
At the end of plaintiff's case, a motion to strike
plaintiff's evidence as being without foundation, not the best
evidence and hearsay was taken under advisement by the Court.
While this motion was not ruled upon formally, it was apparently
denied.

No summary of the debits and credits on the open

acco~t

nor of the items represented by the alleged contracts was made
or offered into evidence.

Nor was there any evidence offered as

to the manner of keeping the books and records of either the
plaintiff or its alleged assignor.
The plaintiff, in its argument to the trial Court reliei
upon the case of State v. Olsen, 287 P 181, 75 U 583 (1930), a
criminal case of bank embezzlement where a bank examiner testifiei
orally to a shortage shown U?On the books of a bank after a
audit by the witness.

for~:

This type of evidence was used in that

case solely to show a shortage of dollars, upon the bank books
not the reasonableness thereof or whether one nerson or another
was liable for the loss.

The case has been followed only in sim·

ilar cases involving shortages of dollars in this state and has
not been cited in this jurisdiction in civil cases where the
issues between the parties are whether or not the charges were fo:
goods

alleged to be sold and delivered or services alleged to be

performed and whether the charges therefor were reasonable or
agreed upon.
The line of cases applicable to the case at bar begins
with Sprague v. Boyle, 4 U 2d 344, 294 P2d 689 (1956), wherein;:
was contended by the anpellant from an adverse judgment that a
-10-
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written summary of $3,295.28 in equipment charges and $2,289.94
in wages was without foundation and not the best evidence.

Tba

Utah Supreme Court held that the schedule was admissable, provided that such a summary of charges must, in order to be
admissable be shown to be developed from records, books, or documents, the competency of which has been established and which
have been made available for examination by adverse counsel.

In

that case, the person who prepared the summary testified from
first hand knowledge as to how the underlying books were kept and
the person had the cancelled checks, invoices and vouchers to
support the charges in Court.
In the case of Nalder v. Kellog, 6 U 2d 367, 314 P2d
350 (1957), a case decided one year after Sprague, the Utah Supreme
Court ruled that it was reversible error to admit three (3)
summaries because some of the figures upon said summaries were not
supported by competent evidence.
Subsequently, in the case of Shupe v. Menlove, 18 U 2d
130, 417 P2d 246 (1966), the appellant contended that it was error
for the trial Court to exclude such a written summary of charges.
This Court ruled that the exclusion was not error, commenting
that rejection of such a summary was within the discretion of the
trial Court where the appellant was suing upon a construction
contract upon a house for costs plus 10% ruling that admission of
such a summary was not a matter of right.
A more recent case involving the same type of testimony
\vas Gull Laboratories v. Louis

A.

Roser Company, No. 15721 filed

December 27, 1978, in the Utah Supreme Court, wherein the president
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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of the plaintiff company testified as to a summary of damages
totalling $65,197.00 that he prepared the summary from the books
and records of his company.

Over objection by defense counsel

that it was not the best evidence, the trial Court admitted the
summary.

This ruling was held to be reversible error on appeal.

This Court cited the Sprague case supra and commented that no
foundation was laid as to the cumbersomeness or unavailability
of the records, nor was there any testimony as to how the original records were made, ie., accounting procedures or regularity
of making entries.

The Court also noted that there was a refusal

to produce the original records.
The proper rule is stated in B. Jones, Evidence (Sth
Ed. 1958) p. 473.
§244--Summaries of Multiple Writings.-Another exception to the best evidence rule,
based on necessity, arises whe.n the primary source of
oroof consists of numerous documents which cannot be
conveniently examined in Court, and the fact to be
proved can only be ascertained by an examination of
the whole collection. It is well established that in
such a case a summary * * *
may be given in evidence by any person who has examined the documents and who is skilled in such matters.
provided the result is capable of being ascertained by
calculation.* ·k *

Rule 63 (13) of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides

t~i

followingexception to the hearsay rule:
" 1-Jritings offered as memoranda or records of
acts, conditions or events to prove the facts stated
if Funding
the for
judge
that
Sponsored by the therein,
S.J. Quinney Law Library.
digitizationfinds
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regular course of business at or about the time of tb!
acti condition or event recorded, and that the sourcee
of nformatlon from which made and the method and
circumstance of their preparation were such as to indicate their trustworthiness."
The dealership of Pioneer was closed out in the three
(3) weeks following August 6, 1975.

Presumably, the books and

records of the plaintiff should reflect such a closeout and the
various charges which make up the balance sought; yet Exhibit "26"
which is a statement prepared by plaintiff on the open account
dated April 20, 1977, almost eight (8) months afterwards, shows a
balance of $14,714.35, only 67% of the balance which the plaintiff
ultimately contended was due upon the open account.

Such books or

records cannot be said to be made at or about the time of the act,
condition or event recorded.
As a part of the alleged amount due upon the open account,
there was a charge for $10,304.60 to the open account,(Exhibit 12,
top of 2nd page) which was claimed by International Harvester as a
"3% penalty" (Exhibit 27 shows one such charge) which was assessed
upon an alleged amount of $306,000.00 worth of equipment that the
plaintiff allegedly took back into its possession. (R. 269-270).
None of the credit invoices representing the

various pieces of

machinery handled in this way were in the possession of the witness
Critchfield nor did he produce them for counsel for plaintiff.
(R. 281-282).
International Harvester Company and the plaintiff are
separate

·

corporat~ons.

(R . 221 L . l) .

Mr. Homestead, an employee

of the plaintiff never testified about how the charges originated,
\vhat the books original entries were, or who kept them or in what
manner they were kept on behalf of the plaintiff.

Nor did he
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teatify as to how any of these matters were accomplished on the
part of International Harvester Company; nor did he testify as to
what charges originated with the plaintiff and what charges were
originated through International Harvester, also there was no
competent evidence that the open account charges of International
Harvester Company were in fact assigned to plaintiff.
The trial Court never made any finding as to the books ;
and records of International Harvester or the plaintiff and the
way they were kept, but if such a finding were made, it could not
be that the entries were made at or about the time of the act,
condition or event recorded as required by Rule 63 (13) URE cited
above.

If such a finding were made, it would be directly opposite

to the requirement of Rule 63 (13) URE.

Such a rule has been

the law of evidence in this state for sixty-five years.

In the

case of Utah Commercial Savings Bank v. Fox, 44 U 323, 140 P 660
(1914), this Court in reversing a judgment and remanding made the
following comment regarding certain book entries which were admit·
ted by the trial Court to show the purpose of a note:
"Even the entries in the books that were
produced have little, if any, probative force,
since in most instances they were made neither
by the person who knew the actual facts recorded,
nor were the entries made at the time the transactions occurred, but were made a long time after
the transactions had taken place. Nor are the
book entries such as clearly explain themselves,
so that one may say they can be implicitly relied
on as tending to establish a particular fact or
facts. Indeed, under the ordinary rules of
evidence, those entries would practically be of
no probative force or effect whatever."
The plaintiff in the subject case did not produce a
summary of the items which made up the total balance, which takes
this case even one step beyond the Sprague, Shupe, Nalder or Gu£
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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I

,
cases, supra.

Such a ruling

totally destroys the hornbook

rule of law that requires a plaintiff to prove its case by a preponderance of the evidence.

Also, such a rule virtually leaves

a dealer or customer at the mercy

of the billing

de~artment

of the seller where the seller bills the customer for various
items, some of them erroneous, and the customer protests the
erroneous items and the billing department has the written records
showing the manner in which orders for the erroneous items were
originated.

In a suit between the seller and the buyer, before

the seller can be given a judgment it should be the seller's
burden to show whether or not orders for the items were in fact
made, and if so, whether there was an agreed upon price or
whether the price was reasonable.
The total inappropriateness of the application of a
rule of evidence which allows evidence three (3) or four (4)
times removed from the actual source to be admitted is easily seen
when it is considered that $1,914.07 or almost 10% of the account
balance sued upon was conceded by the plaintiff as being erroneous only on the day of the trial and further, when the errors
which consistently cropped up, are considered, the trustworthiness
of the books of the plaintiff is seen to be very poor.
a.

Pioneer ordered $300.00 to $400.00 worth of nuts

and bolts resulting in over $5,000.00 worth of nuts and bolts being
shipped and Pioneer's account was charged with those items.

It

took numerous demands and seven months for IHCC to remove this
charge from the account. (R. 304).
b.

IHCC charged defendant's open account with

$6,000.00
worth
of Law
tools
which
were provided
to go
a ofnote,
took
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numerous demands and several months to remove this charge from
the account. (R. 304).
c.

International Harvester Company shipped to

Pioneer $4,000.00 worth of obsolete parts which Pioneer did not
order and which did not fit any machinery which Pioneer had in
stock.

These parts were still in the inventory at the close out

of the dealership.

Pioneer only received $2,000.00 credit for

them. (R.401-403).
d.

International Harvester Company shipped to

Pioneer seven (7) boxes of service binders not ordered, Pioneer
never received credit for these binders. (R. 386).
POINT I I
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING ORAL

EVIDENCE THAT PIONEER OWED THE
PLAINTIFF $4,311.81 ON NOTES
Plaintiff's witness, Homestead testified over the objection of defense counsel as to no foundation, hearsay and not
the best

evidence that defendants owed plaintiff the sum of

$4,311.81 upon wholesale notes.

(R.

211-213).

The notes were

never admitted into evidence, never produced for examination of
counsel and the execution thereof was denied by defendants.
The general rule is found at Bills and Notes, 12 Am Jur
2nd p. 333

§

1299:
"As a general rule, at least, there can be no
recovery on an alleged bill or note which is not
introduced in evidence if its absence is not explained as a foundation for proof of its contents
See also 11 CJS Bills & ~otes § 682

In searching the Utah cases on this point, there are
cases which hold that where the pro!!lissor admits execution of
the notes, that it is not necessarv to oroduce the original docc·
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ment, Albergo v. Gigliotti, 96 U 170, 85 P2d 107 (1938).
ever, where there is an issue as to the execution and existance
of the note, it is a proper rule that the original be produced
and marked "reduced to judgment."

Utah Commercial Savings Bank

v. Fox, 44 U 323, 140 P 660 (1914).

In this matter, the amended

complaint did not alleg! the execution and delivery of the notes,
but merely alleged a balance due which was denied in the answer
of defendants and again in the opening statement of defendants
counsel, again in a motion to dismiss and again in a Rule 59
motion.

The testimony of plaintiff's witness was admitted over

the objection of defense counsel, which was error.

The sum of

$4,311.85 was used to arrive at the amount of the judgment and
this sum should be deducted therefrom.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT CHARGED THE DEFENDA.'IT
WITH RETAIL CONTRACT LOSSES CONTRARY
TO THE PROVISIONS OF A CONTRACT WHICH
WAS DRAFTED BY THE PLAINTIFF
Exhibit "2" was described by Del Homestead at (R. 178
L. 2) as being a document that sets up the financing arrangements
between International Harvester Credit Corporation and Pioneer
Tractor and Implement for retail financing of agricultural equipment.

This document is on a printed form bearing the logo of

plaintiff in the upper right hand corner.
Exhibit "E" attached to Exhibit "2" provided as follows:
"R. DEALER AGREES AS TO EACH RETAIL CONTRACT ACCEPTED
BY IHCC:
l. That the down oayment and terms of sale shall be
in compliance with IHCC's authorized terms in effect at
the time such Retail Contract is submitted for acceptance
by IHCC.
2. That he warrants that:
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(a) The Retail Contract will be valid and free
from defenses, offsets, or counterclaims;
(b) the Retail Contract will constitute a first
lien in favor of IHCC upon the goods for which it
will have been given, and it will have been filed
or recorded according to law to preserve the priority of such lien;
(c) all statements contained therein and in the
purchaser's statement will be true and complete;
(d) ~o part of the down payment or of any installment will have been advanced, directly or
indirectly, by him to the user;
(e) on the date of the assignment or endorsement
to IHCC the goods will have been delivered; and
(f) the transaction represented by the Retail
Contract was an actual bona fide sale in the usual
course of business.
3. Upon request by IHCC, to purchase from it for cash
for the unpaid balance thereof, plus IHCC's expenses, less
unearned finance charges, and less credits to the Dealer's
reserve account, provided for in Section A-2 (a) hereof,
any Retail Contract if he has breached any warranty or
agreement with respect thereto contained in this Arrangement. No formal tender of any Retail Contract for purchase
by Dealer shall be required.
4. Upon the request of IHCC to render, without charge,
assistance in its collection or in repossession of goods
covered by Retail Contracts, and upon repossession, to
store and care for such goods, subject to IHCC's order,
all without cost to IHCC. Also, upon request of IHCC,
and upon being furnished by IHCC with such replacement
parts as may be necessary, to recondition the repossessed
goods. In such cases, Dealer's established customer rates
for labor shall be paid by IHCC.
5. That he hereby waives presentment, protest, and all
demands or notice as to each Retail Contract, and consents
to anv extensions of time or compromise with any persons
without affecting his liability. (em~hasis added)
6. That he hereby authorizes IHCC, at its option, to
pay to IH to be apulied to his obligations, all or any par:
of any amounts which he might otherwise be entitled to receive in cash from IHCC under this Arrangement ....
and at paragraph 8 thereof:
8. As security for, and not in lieu of, performance b:·
Dealer of all obligations of this arrangement, to the
establishment of a suecial reserve account in Dealer's
name, herein referred to as "Dealer's Reserve Account."
(a) such dealer's reserve account:.
(iv) Subject to the reservation of 8(c) belo•.,•
shall be debited
all losses, including out of-
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It was undisputed that the reserve account of the dealer,
Pioneer had a credit balance of $5,000.00 (R. 511 and Exhibit "12")
as of December 31, 1976 and that the pur?ose of the reserve account
is to protect the dealer from astronomical losses and also to
protect International Harvester Credit Corporation. (R. 183).
The following char~es were for losses allegedly sustained by
the plaintiff as a result of retail contracts upon new agricultural
equipment.
a.

Myron Jones:

In Hay of 1976, Pioneer sold a tractor

upon a retail contract and it was financed by the plaintiff upon
a retail contract (R. 188) as a result of this the plaintiff charged
52,800.00 to the ooen account which was objected to on grounds of
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foundation. (R. 188).

An interest charge of $1,006.00 was also

made to the open account upon this aame transaction.
b.

Duane Taylor:

The plaintiff charged defendants

account with $2,832.46 because the customer contended that he
owed something different

than the sum stated in the retail

contract and the retail contract was not in evidence. (R. 195).
c.

A charge of $1,278.35 on a retail contract of

William Branch was made to the finance reserve account of Pioneer
which, if properly proved would have been proper.

However, the

plaintiff is inconsistent in the treatment of this loss on a
retail contract.

All losses upon retail contracts should have

been so treated.
d.

A charge of $599.03 for a hitch upon a drill for

retail customer, Garth Sweeten which the defendant contended
was ordered with the drills from International Harvester and not
delivered. (R. 343).

The plaintiff claimed that it had to furn-

ish such a hitch.
e.

A charge of $431.63 based upon a contention of

retail customer Sam Kogianes that his combine should have had a
different attachment upon his combine than his agreement provided
The foregoing losses, exclusive of the Branch contract,
~vhich

was charged to the reserve account rather than the open

account,amount to $7,669.12, and were included in the findings
of fact and the judgment amount.
Nowhere in Exhibits "1" or "2" is there an attempt at the
definition of what Hould be termed a "loss" under a retail contract, but the use of the terms "all losses" sustained by IHCC
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on any retail contract in paragraph 8(a) (iv) would certainly
indicate to any person reading it that the company (IHCC),
when it used that term meant it to mean just that - all
losses.

However, when the company applied the agreement to the

facts here, it refused to apply paragraph 8, according to its
terms, and charged all losses on retail contacts of equipment
to the

open

account.

When questioned about this at pages

237-239, plaintiff's witness Homestead indicated that the company
only charged the reserve account when there was a repossession,
preferring to hold the dealer's reserve account without interest
and charge the dealer's open account with such losses, as
claiming that such non-repossession losses came under the provisions of paragraph B instead.

Paragraph 8 does not use the

term "only repossession losses" or even use the term

"repossessi.cn'~

or make any distinction or modification of what it means by the
term "all losses."
Assuming for the purpose of argument that some breach of the
provisions of paragraph B (2) was proved by competent evidence
in the Court below, it is apparent that there is a conflict between the provision of paragraph B (3) (5) and paragraph C (8).
However, viewed in their proper perspective, it is apparent that
the provisions of paragraph C 8 (b) and (c) were intended to
'protect the dealer from astronomical losses" upon retail contracts.
See Homestead's testimony at (R. 183).
It was plaintiff's contention at trial that the following
•.vords in Exhibit 2 E allowed plaintiff to make compromises with
retail customers and charge them to the dealer's account:
"B.

Dealer agrees as to each Retail Contract accepted by
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IHCC:
5. That he hereby waives presentment, protest, and
all demands or notice as to each Retail Contract, and
consents to any extension of time or comoromise with any
persons, without affecting his liability."
The sole word out of all of the exhibits that purportedly
gives the plaintiff authority to charge Pioneer's account with
the above retail losses is the word "compromise."

None of the

documents specify just what item or items the dealer purportedly
consents in advance to "compromise" or in what manner such compromise is to be accomplished.

The word "compromise" is used

in the agreement in the same phrase as consenting to extensions
of time and therefore, could be construed as consenting to
compromise as to the time an obligation is to be paid.

Also,

the word compromise is followed by "without affecting his liability."

Does this mean that the dealer only consents to a

compromise without affecting the dealers liability?

If so, then

it could be inferred that the dealer's liability could not be increased by the compromise; as to do so would certainly "affect"
the dealer's liability.

It is submitted that such a brief phrase

having so many possible interpretations could not and should not
be construed to cost a dealer several thousand dollars at the
whim of the holder thereof.
In any event, to use such a phrase to charge losses upon
retail contracts to the dealers open account is contrary to the
plain intent of the language in paragraPh 8(a) (iv), 8(b) and
8(c), cited above and is a direct contradiction to the well recognized rule of law in this and other jurisdictions that documents drafted by a party will be strictly construed againstthat
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party.

Guinand v. Walton, 22 U 2d 196, 450

at 25 U 2d 253, 480 P2d 137 (1971), Seal v. Tayco, 16 U 2d 323,
400 P2d 503 (1963), Christopher v. Larson Ford, 557 P2d 1009,
) Skousen v. Smith, 27 U 2nd 169, 493 P2d 1003

(1976)'
(1972).

Bank of Ephraim v. Davis,

538 (1977).

___u

2d _ __ 559 P2d

The Seal case is particularly applicable to the

instant case.

A distributor of brake shoes sued a dealer and the

dealer counterclaimed, based upon delay by the distributor.

The

distributor claimed that the words "In no event shall seller be
liable for special or consequential damages," which comprised
the last sentence in a paragraph, gave the distributor a blanket
protection against any claim, while the dealer claimed that such
language was limited to the causes which immediately preceded
this sentence.
This Court ruled for the dealer, commenting:
" ... it seems manifestly unfair to permit one who
formulates a contract to so fashion it as to mislead
the other party by setting forth a clearly apparent
promise or representation in order to induce acceptance, and then designedly "burying" elsewhere in the
document, in fine print, provisions which purport to
limit or take away the promise, and/or preclude recovery for failure to fulfill it."
The testimony of Wayne Schoenfeld was that Homestead told
him that the losses on retail contracts would be limited to
$1,000.00 charged to the reserve account, (R. 399-401), but
such oral testimony was stricken by the Court.
In the instant case, as in Seal, a party should not have
the benefit of drafting an instrument with conflicting provisions
in it make representations as to its benefits and then have it
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construed in such a way as to maximize his benefits in the event
of a dispute, thus the charges of $7,669.12 should be deducted
from the open account and charged to the dealer's reserve
account in accordance with the terms of plaintiff's own agreenent.

POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RECEIVING
EVIDENCE OF MONEY TRANSACTIONS
BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND INTERNATIONAL
HARVESTER COMPANY TO SUPPORT A 3%
~~DLI~G CHARGE, WHICH WAS IN FACT
A PENALTY
The Court received testimony from Noel Critchfield as to
a purported telephone bill of $450 (R. 288), a charge of $13,800.00
as interest charged by the olaintiff to International Harvester
for inventory returned from Pioneer (R. 272) and $2,300.00 as
a service charge (R. 274) over the objections of defense counsel
as

bein~

without foundation and not the best evidence.

These

items were presented to the Court for the purpose of showing
that a 3% handling charge was not a penalty and bore no relationship to the out-of-pocket expenses incurred by International
Harvester Company in the close-out of the dealership.
Other than the telephone bill, the witness was not asked
if he had personal knowledge of any of the charges to which he
testified.

No business records or other documents were offered

or admitted to show any of said charges, nor was there any evidence oral or

writte~

that a cause of action for any of said

amounts was assigned to olaintiff.
In answers to

interro~atories,

as to the question of out-

of-pocket costs incurred, the plaintiff at (R. 75-92) onlv
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specified the figure of $3,147.81 with $670.00 of that
being an estimate only.

As to International Harvester

employees, there was an expenditure of approximately $2,000.00
in out-of-oocket expenses including an amount which was est-

An objections was made to the amount

imated (R. 287-288).

which was estimated on the basis of no foundation (R. 288).
As to the charges between International Harvester Company and
the plaintiff, the witness Critchfield admitted that he didn't
have the documents

suoporting their transactions and said docu-

ments had never been made available to counsel for plaintiff
(R. 281-283).

At finding; of fact No. 7 (R. 23), such evidence

was referred to in the finding of the Court that "evidence was
Dresented showing substantial costs to International Harvester'
as a result of repurchase of the

equi~ment.

Such evidence,

other than the evidence and documents produced at (R. 75-92)
should have been excluded on the basis of best evidence, hearsay
and no foundation in accordance with defendant's objections and
motion to strike at the end of ?laintiff's case. (R. 288).
Plaintiff's witness Homestead testified that of the ryersons who were listed upon the supplemental answers to interrogatories, the following employees were employed by International
Harvester Company. (R. 235-236):
$

N.R. Critchfield

784.33

H. Enright

193.51

F.L. Jacobsen

208.57
137.16
$1,313.57

R.D. Coffman

-25-
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The salaries of these employees were incurred by
International Harvester Company regardless of whether they
participated in the close-out of Pioneer. (R. 236).

The total

charges incurred by International Harvester Company actually
proved by any competent evidence was the sum of $1,313.57 in
out-of-pocket costs.

The remainder of any alleged expenses

should have been excluded upon the basis of no foundation and
hearsay for the same reasons and under the same cases as cited
in subsection I above.
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
THE 3% PENALTY CHARGE BORE A REASONABLE
RELATIONSHIP TO THE COSTS AND EXPENSES
ACTUALLY INCURRED 13Y INTERNATIONAL
HARVESTER COMPANY
The 37. handling charge referred to as a penalty on invoices
of International Harvester Company is referred to at paragraph

29 of Exhibit "1", the parties to which are International Harvester
Corporation in closing out the dealership are shown in the supplemental answers to interrogatories and as testified to by Del
Homestead are shown as the expenses of Noel Critchfield - $784.33,
W. Enwright- $193.51, F.L. Jacobson- $208.57, and R.D.

- $137.16, which totals $1,323.57.

Coffm~

Otherwise, the freight and

handling of the equipment was accomplished by Pioneer Tractor or
other dealers.

Hhile Mr. Homestead testified to other expenses,

these were expenses of International Harvester Credit Company,
not International Harvester Company, the Darty to the contract.
The plaintiff cannot claim these expenses because they were not
parties to the contract, nor have they been competently oroven.
"Section 70A-2-718 U.C.A. Drovides in oart that
the oarties may agree to a· liquidated damage
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clause in the event of breach, but only in an
am01.mt which is reasonable in the light of the
anticipated or actual harm caused by the breach."
It is submitted that $1,323.57 does not bear a reasonable relationship to the sum of $10,364.30, even if said figure
was competently proved.

The sum of $10,364.30 is almost eight

(8) times the actual expenses incurred by International
Harvester Corporation as a result of the termination of the dealership.

Such a windfall has been uniformly held to be a penalty

and not enforceable.

P2d 446 (1952).

See Berkins v. Spencer, 112 U 468, 243

Such a policy has been aryplied to sales of

merchandise, Western Macaroni v. Fiore, 47 U 108, 151 P 984 (1915).
Also see Restatements of Contracts

§

339.

The Western Macaroni case contained the following rule:
"When the question of whether a contract provides a
penalty or liquidated damages is in doubt, the contract
ordinarily will be regarded as providing a penalty. If
the stipulation is a penalty, it, as such, will not be
enforced, but simply the actual amount of dama~es sustained if less that the amount of the penalty.'
In the Hestern Macaroni case, the Court upheld a lower
Court ruling that a $500.00 liquidated damae;e amount was a penalty where the actual damages suffered was $80.00, a case in
which the liquidated amount was about six (6) times the damages
actually incurred.
The Western Macaroni case was cited favorably in the
Perkins case suura and has not been overturned or modified by any
decision since that time.

(See discussion of cases in Perkins).

Since the Perkins case, this Court decided the case of Johnson v.
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U _ _ , 572 P2d 371 (1977) where this language was

Carman,

used in upholding a trial Court decision:

"Althoughwe do not purport to lay down any specific
percentage which will be considered unconscionable, to
allow seller to retain the $34,596.10 paid by buyer when
seller's actual damages amount to only $25,650.00 would
be "grossly excessive and disproportionate to any loss."
Such would be to allow seller to retain payments totalling
some 34% greater than the actual damages determined by the
trial Court."
The situation as to the actual damages the plaintiff or
its assignor may or may not have sustained in reselling said
equipment is rather obscure, as the defendants requested the resale price of the equipment in interrogatories, which information
was never provided by the plaintiff. (Seep. 165).

When plain-

tiff's witness Homestead was asked why such information was never
provided, the witness said:
"No, it has not, because the equipment was taken
back in accordance with the sales and service
agreement." (R. 241)
~fuen

asked what steps he had taken to verify where the

information was, the witness replied at (R. 242 L. 2):
"I have not taken it upon myself to contact the
Kansas City office to try and institute a search
for these records unless it's absolutely necessary
because of the costs involved."
It is apparent from the foregoing that the plaintiff does
not deem its loss in this

re~ard

significant enough

out the records necessary to prove its case.

to search

Perhaps the reason

is that the plaintiff did not incur the loss.
It is submitted that under all of the facts and circumstances, that plaintiff should not be allowed to reap a windfall
of approximately $9,000.00 at the expense of defendants.
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POINT VI
IT l\IAS ERROR FOR THE COURT TO REFUSE
TO ALLOW AN AMENDMENT PURSUANT TO RULE
15(b) URCP TO SHOW SUBSEQUENT AGREEMENT
THAT NO LIABILITY BEYOND THE APPLICATION
OF ASSETS OF PIONEER TO THE DEBT TO IHCC
WOULD BE CHARGED
Exhibit No. 25 is a two (2) part document, the first
page of which is a paper in the handwiring of Wayne Schoea£e14
ca?tioned:
"WE Ol\IE

TO HARVESTER"

--------------------$

Lawn Mower
Combine ----------------------Mbnater (sic) ----------------Stei~er ----------------------Check -------------------------

Freight --------------$21,881.11
Pure. Lawn Equip.----- 1,000.00
Warranty AG ---------- 4,165.66
~.Jarranty Truck ------1,208.80
Parts ---------------- 6,000.00
Equipment ------------ 25,500.00

200.00
22,381.00
363.95
17,500.00
3,800.0$ 44,044.95

TRADES
TD 9 Cat
D 6 Cat ---------

--------$

4500.00
9000.00
Red Truck ------6500.00
Drills (2) -----3000.00
2 Used tiC Drill 1000.00
A tractor ------- ·
900.00
H tractor ------600.00
$25,500.00"

_

__;~;....:..::..;:.

$59,755.57

The second page is a security agreement

~repared

by Del

Homestead on behalf of International Harvester Credit which provides as follows:
"For good and valuable consideration, the receipt
of which is hereby acknowledged, the undersigned Pioneer
Tractor and Implement Inc., (X) Corporation located or
residing at Spanish Fork, Utah (hereinafter called Debtor),
for the purpose of additionally securing payment of a
certain contract(s), note(s), security agreement(s) or
account(s) (hereinafter individually and collectively
called contract) entered into by and between the debtor
and International Harvester Cornoany dated
, 19
,
and on which Debtor is presently indebted to InternatfOnal
Harvester Credit Corn. (hereinafter called Secured Party),
as seller or seller's assignee, in the total amount of
$44,322.00, payable in installments as follows: ... "
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Homestead took possession oD the original of Exhibit No.

25.
Mr. Don Sterret, general sales manager of Pioneer testified that he, Schoenfeld and Critchfield had a meeting and he
and Schoenfeld were told what to eX?ect in the close-out of the
dealership a day or two after the resignation of Pioneer.

The

assets and what was owed would pretty much handle themselves
and Homestead and Critchfield concurred.

Mr. Noel Critchfield testified that he and Del Homestead,
prior to the meeting with Schoenfeld had discussed the figures
contained on Exhibit No. 25 and had agreed to those figures.
(R. 549-551).

Mr. Pugsley at p. 550 asked the following question:
"With respect to Exhibit 25 which has been shown to
you, did you ever agree to those figures in the meeting that has
been referred to?
I believe Del Wrote these figures up, and when he
went over them with me I was agreeable with them, yes.
Do you know that this is Mr. Homestead's writing?
Not exactly, I don't; but we, Del and I discussed
these things prior to our meeting with."
A motion was made by defendants at the close of evidence
to amend the answer of defendants to conform to the evidence
that the agents of the plaintiff and International Harvester
Company had made a novation and waived the 3% handling charge.
(R. 551).

1.-Jhile the motion was taken under advisement, it appar·

ently was denied.
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Rule 15(b) URCP provides as follows:
11

(b) AMENDMENTS TO CONFORM TO THE EVIDENCE :

When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by
express or implied consent of the oarties, they shall ba
treated in all respects as if they.had been raised to
cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these
issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time,
even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not
affect the result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it
is not to be amended when the presentation of the merits
of the action will be subserved thereby and the objectina
party fails to satisfy the Court that the admission of
such evidence would prejudice him in ma&ntaining his
action or defense upon the merits. The Court shall grant
a continuance, if necessary, to enable the objecting party
to meet such evidence. 11
When an issue as to a second agreement has been tried with
the implied consent of the parties, it is error for the trial
Court not to grant a motion made pursuant to Rule 15(b) URCP.
Cheney v. Rucker, 14 U 2nd 205, 381 P2d 86 (1963).

Parties to

a written agreement may, by their subsequent action modify such
agreements notwithstanding provisions to the contrary in the
first agreement.

Dillman v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 13 U 2d 142,

(1962) 369 P2d 296, Calhoun v. Universal Credit, 106 U 166, 146
P2d 284 (1944), Davis v. Payne, 10 U 2d 53, 348 P2d 337.
The motion by defendant to amend should have been granted,
and the Court should have found that the parties by their actions
formed a new agreement and waived the 3% handling charge.
POINT VII
THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING INTEREST IN
THE SUM OF $5,291.09.
Plaintiff's witness Homestead testified over the objection
of defendant's counsel that his calculations showed that the
~laintiff

was entitled to the sum of $5,219.09 as interest.
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was upon the total amount of $25,098.36, which was comprised
of $4,311.81 upon wholesale notes and $19,780.19 upon the open
account. There was no testimony as to when the interest began to
accrue or what rate was used in this computation, other than
that it was based upon the prime rate of three (3) New York
banks which were never named by the witness.
Exhibit "1" provides at page 7 first paragraph "Such
notes or contracts shall mature according to the terms in effect
at the time of delivery and draw interest at the rate established
by the Company and specified therein.
to the notes or contracts.

The word "therein" refers

No notes or contracts other than

Exhibit "2" were entered into evidence.

There is a Schedule of

terms stlapled to the back cover of Exhibit "1", after the signature of Pioneer, which schedule bears only one staple, while
Exhibit "l" to which said schedule is attached bears two staple
holes which go from the front cover through the back cover, but
doesnot go through the schedule attached inside the back cover,
showing that the schedule was not always attached to Exhibit "1".
This schedule at page 4 has a clause which provides that
interest owed on floor plan obligations will be due monthly and
determined at 3-l/2% over the prime rate after maturity and
1-l/2% over prime rate before maturity.

There is no mention in

this exhibit of the interest rate to be charged upon retail contracts or upon the open account.

It is impossible to tell from

the evidence r.;hat if any part of the sums claimed bv the plaintii'
were floor plan obligations, and which items were not floor plan
obligations.

In any event, the latter clause is in conflict
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the first provision at page 7, first paragraph of Exhibit "1"
which is a printed form, bearing the logo of International
Harvester Company and was drawn by plaintiff's alleged assignor.
In the event of a conflict or vagueness in terms of such a document, the document should be construed against the drawer.
See the Guinand, Seal and Bank of Ephriam cases
There were no notes or contracts

i~

~·

evidence from which

a rate can be established pursuant to the first paragraph of page
7 of Exhibit "1".

Without a written document providing for a

different rate of interest signed by the party to be charged.
The only rate of interest which would be applicable would
be the statutory rate of 6% as provided in 15-1-1 (U.C.A. 1953
as amended).

Which section provides as folLows:

"Legal Rate-The legal rate of interest for the
loan or forebearance of any money, ~oods or thin~s in
action shall be six per cent per annum. But nothing
herein contained shall be so construed as to in any
way affect any penalty or interest charge which by law
applies to delinquent or other taxes or to any contract
or obligations made before the 14th day of May, 1907."
Are the charges upon which plaintiff is suing a loan or
forebearance of any money, goods or thi111;s in action?
In particular, a purported charge for $10,304.30 made
in the close-out of the dealership upon defendants' open account,

\vas based upon 3% of an alleged amount of inventory that was
returned to International Harvester at the expense of Pioneer.
There was no evidence to TJrove this charge Presented to the
Court.

There was no evidence that as a result of said charge,

the defendant Pioneer received any "loan or forebearance of any
monev, goods or things in action."

There are no cases in Utah

which interoret this part of the foregoing statute.

It is
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submitted however, that it was not the intent of the drafter
of such a statute to charge a 6% per annum charge in addition
to a 3% charge upon an amount that is unverifiable until
judgment.
This Court has consistently held, however, that in

order

to assess interest, the time of the loss or damage must be ascertained and the interest capable of being mathematically
computed from the evidence.

Fell v. Union

Pacific Corporation,

32 U 101, 88 P 1003 (1907); Uinta Pipeline Corporation v. White
Superior Co. ,

u

2d

, 546 P2d 885 (1976); Anderson v.

State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., ______ U2d

, 583 P2d 101 (1978).

Nowhere in the evidence did the plaintiff establish the
date or dates upon which the various and sundry charges they
claim came into being.

Without such information, a total amount

of interest cannot be calculated.

The sum of $5,291.09 as

interest should be deducted from the findings.
POINT VIII
IT WAS ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO
DENY THE DEFENDANTS A TRIAL BY JURY
can
This Court, in reviewing the recordi make mathematical
deductions from the findings of fact and conclusions of law as
(see the Seal case, supra)
it deems properf If this is truly a case in equity, as the pla~·
tiff insisted in a motion to strike the jury demand, then this
Court has the prerogative and the right to weigh the evidence
and decide questions of fact relating thereto.
v. Larson Ford (supra).

On the other hand,

See Christopher

if in fact this is a

case at law, then the defendants have a right to have the issues
decided by a jurv.

See Vallev !-1ortuar' v. Fairbanks, 119 U
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225 P2d 739 (1950).

This action was not a foreclosure of a

mortgage or for other equitable relief, but a suit upon notes
and an account and a guaranty with issues having equitable
aspects in which there were underlying factual issues upon which
a jury could have acted in an advisory capacity both on the main
case and the third party complaint.

If this court does remand

this case for a new trial, then a direction should be made to
try the case before a jury.
CO~lCLUSION

In conclusion, the findings and judgment of the trial
Court are based upon testimony that was not the best evidence,
hearsay evidence and information having no foundation.

It was

error for the trial Court to deny defendant's motion to dismiss,
motion to amend the findings and judgment or in the alternative
for a new trial.

This Court should either remand this case

with instructions to make findings in accordance with the
actual, competent evidence

adduced at the trial, or to remand

this case for a new trial upon all issues in the claim and third
party claim by a jury.
Respectfully submitted this 13th day of April, 1979.
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